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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1984, Jorge E. Garzon, a citizen of Colombia, was
stopped for a traffic violation.' During routine questioning by the
police regarding his immigration status, Garzon admitted that he
had a shopping bag containing $91,000 in cash in the rear of his
vehicle. He claimed that he planned to use the money to purchase
some shoes.2 The officers were suspicious and called investigative
1, Garzon's automobile was stopped by officers of Miami's Metro-Dade Police Depart-
ment. Garzon v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
2. Garzon further asserted that he was a shoe store manager at a shop called Emerald
Shoes. This was confirmed. Id. at 740.
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agents' who searched Garzon's car and apartment and interrogated
him for several hours.' No evidence of criminal activity was found
as a result of the search.5
Garzon was released, but all of his money was retained. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was notified of the possible need
for an assessment.6 The IRS employs both jeopardy and termina-
tion assessments to prevent suspect individuals from fleeing with-
out paying taxes or from dissipating assets while tax liabilities are
calculated.' In such cases, an estimated tax may be collected im-
mediately without following normal tax assessment procedure
(which includes notice and a period of time during which the tax-
payer may challenge an assessment without paying any money
due).8
Using Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code as authority,'
the IRS agent included $91,000 as gross income and determined
that Garzon owed $38,346 in taxes. Garzon said that the currency
was part of an inheritance from his father's estate in 1981 and had
been brought into the United States in installments from Colombia
by Hernan Cortes Ortiz, the man to whom Garzon had sold his
inherited farm. Customs was able to locate CMIRs'0 which re-
flected that Ortiz had properly reported bringing in currency in
excess of $350,000.11
Garzon brought an action against the United States Govern-
3. Detectives from the Organized Crime Bureau of the Miami-Dade County Public
Safety Department were called in who, in turn, summoned the U.S. Customs Service and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 740.
4. Garzon voluntarily consented to the search. A dog trained to sniff narcotics was used
to sniff the currency, automobile and apartment. Id. at 741.
5. Id. at 741. It is notable that Miami has a reputation as the "Wall Street of the illegal
drug world." Most of the marijuana and cocaine used in the United States enters through
South Florida, pouring billions of untaxed "narcobucks" into the state's economy. The Rea-
gan administration has increasingly concentrated on this money and on the middlemen who
manage, launder and invest it. So, it is not unexpected behavior, in the Miami area, for local
police to call in the full force of the IRS and other federal agencies to reinforce "the war on
drugs." Shopping bags filled with cash and possessed by Latins are instantly suspect. See A
New Attack on Drugs, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1986, at 30-31.
6. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 741.
7. Vicknair v. United States, 617 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 6861 (1982).
9. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 1985).
10. CMIRs [Form 4790] are Currency or Monetary Instruments Reports of the Depart-
ment of Treasury. These forms must be filed with Customs whenever more than $5,000 is
transported into the United States. The $91,000 seized by police was allegedly part of the
farm money transported by Ortiz from Colombia. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 741.
11. Id.
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ment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, seeking judicial review of the IRS assessment. A speedy review
mechanism is available under 26 U.S.C. Section 7429(f), which af-
fords prompt administrative and judicial review of the propriety of
any jeopardy assessment.'" The Government asserted that Garzon
could not avail himself of this immediate judicial review because
Section 7429(e) refers matters of venue to 28 U.S.C. Section
1402(a)(1), which provides that "a civil action may be prosecuted
against the United States . . . only in the judicial district where
the plaintiff resides." 3 The Government filed a motion to dismiss
for improper venue, 4 as Garzon was clearly a nonresident alien.
The presiding judge, Clyde Atkins, noted that the Government
seemed willing to saddle Garzon with the burdens and obligations
of taxation while insisting that he was not entitled to the expedited
review remedies allowed other taxpayers.'5 Judge Atkins decided
that his court could not condone what appeared to be "a logically
inconsistent and patently unfair result."' 6 The Garzon court held
that nonresident alien taxpayers would be allowed to avail them-
selves of the statutory benefits of expedited review in contesting
jeopardy and termination assessments. 7 No other court has per-
mitted a nonresident alien to escape the venue bar asserted under
a literal interpretation of Sections 7429(e) and 1402(a)(1). This
comment will trace the reasoning underlying the statutory need for
jeopardy assessments, the advent of Section 7429, the venue
problems faced by aliens subjected to U.S. jeopardy taxation and
the seminal cases that have led to the Garzon recognition of equal
rights for nonresident alien taxpayers.
12. Vicknair, 617 F.2d at 1131.
13. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 742 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1402 (a)(1)).
14. Id. at 742.
15. Id. at 743. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides that an alien may be sued in any
district. See generally Berger, Alien Venue: Neither Necessary Nor Constitutional, 9
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 155 (1976) (a complete discussion of alien venue).
16. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 745. See United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("once aliens become subject to liability under United States law, they also have
the right to benefit from its protection"); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th
Cir.1978).
17. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 745.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Jeopardy Assessments
Article I of the United States Constitution is the source of the
broad congressional taxing powers. 8 The Internal Revenue Service
is authorized by Congress to implement the taxing power as an es-
sential component of the revenue raising function of the Govern-
ment. The IRS is also responsible for preventing tax avoidance,
and in this connection, has been granted jeopardy and termination
assessment powers. 9
Sections 6851, 6861 and 68620 of the Internal Revenue Code
18. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1 authorizes Congress to "lay and collect taxes."
19. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 364 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3793, for a thorough discussion of jeopardy and termination assessments.
20. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6851, 6861, 6862 (1982).
26 U.S.C. § 6851 Termination Assesments of Income Tax. If the Secretary finds
that a taxpayer designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove
his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do
any other act (including in the case of a corporation distributing all or part of its
assets in liquidation or otherwise) tending to prejudice or to render wholly or
partially ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax for the current or the
immediately preceding taxable year unless such proceeding be brought without
delay, the Secretary shall immediately make a determination of tax for the cur-
rent taxable year or for the preceding taxable year, or both, as the case may be,
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, such tax shall become immedi-
ately due and payable. The Secretary shall immediately assess the amount of the
tax so determined (together with all interest, additional amounts, and additions
to the tax provided by law) for the current taxable year of such preceding taxa-
ble year or both, as the case may be, and shall cause notice of such determina-
tion and assessment to be given the taxpayer, together with a demand for imme-
diate payment of such tax.
26 U.S.C. § 6861 Jeopardy Assessments of Income, Estate, Gift, and Certain
Excise Taxes. If the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a
deficiency, as defined in § 6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwith-
standing the provisions of § 6213(a), immediately assess such deficiency (to-
gether with all interest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided
for by law), and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his dele-
gate for the payment thereof.
26 U.S.C. § 6862 Jeopardy Assessment of Taxes Other Than Income, Estate,
Gift, and Certain Excise Taxes. If the Secretary believes that the collection of
any tax (other than income tax, estate tax, gift tax, and the excise taxes imposed
by chapters 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45) under any provision of the Internal Revenue
laws will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, whether or not the time otherwise
prescribed by law for making return and paying such tax has expired, immedi-
ately assess such tax (together with all interest, additional amounts, and addi-
tions to the tax provided for by law). Such tax, additions to the tax, and interest
shall thereupon become immediately due and payable, and immediate notice
and demand shall be made by the Secretary for the payment thereof.
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embody methods of tax assessment and collection available to the
Internal Revenue Service. These sections are pertinent in cases
where the more routine methods of tax collection are ineffective or
"jeopardized" to some degree because collection efforts are
delayed.2
Ordinarily if a taxpayer objects to an IRS audit, he can peti-
tion the Tax Court for a review and he need not remit any funds
until he has a full hearing and a final judgment. However, if a tax-
payer appears to be planning to flee the country, conceal himself or
his assets or hide, remove, transfer or dissipate his property."2 The
IRS can abbreviate the ordinary assessment process and secure an
immediate seizure of assets, effectively freezing them until the ex-
istence and amount of tax liability can subsequently be deter-
mined.s3 The IRS utilizes jeopardy and termination assessments to
assist other government agencies in a quest to outwit illegal money
laundering and drug operations2 4 Assessments so made, prior to
any formal Tax Court hearing, help insure against a suspect tax-
payer leaving the jurisdiction or rendering himself judgment proof.
21. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 741. Note that a termination assessment (§ 6851) is made
for a tax year which has ended but for which the due date for filing the required return has
not yet passed. A jeopardy assessment (§ 6861 or § 6862) is made for a tax year which has
ended and for which the due date for filing the required return has passed. See Nolan v.
United States, 539 F. Supp. 788 (D.C. Ariz. 1982).
22. Simpson v. I.R.S., 573 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Tenn. 1983) See also, § 5213.21(2) of the
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL which states the standards for jeopardy and termination
assessments.
The stated IRS position concerning both jeopardy assessments and terminations
is that they should be made 'sparingly,' be 'reasonable in amount in the light of
existing facts,' and be personally approved by the district director. Further, it is
the policy of the IRS that they should not be made unless at least one of the
following conditions concerning the taxpayer in question is met: (1) he is, or
appears to be, designing quickly either to leave the United States or otherwise
conceal himself; or (2) he is, or appears to be, designing quickly either to remove
his property from the United States, or to conceal or transfer it to others, or to
dissipate it; or (3) his financial solvency is, or appears to be, endangered.
S. REP. No. 938, supra note 19, at 360 n.1. For a review of jeopardy and termination assess-
ments, see Andrews, Jeopardy, Termination, and Mathematical or Clerical Error Assess-
ments After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
23. United States v. Doyle, 660 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1981).
24. Oversight Subcommittee Seeks Ways to Clean Up Money Laundering Operations,
TAX NOTES 1320 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Subcommittee]. For an in depth discussion of
jeopardy procedures see Armen, Assessing Internal Revenue Service Jeopardy Procedures,
26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 413 (1977). Note that the use of jeopardy assessments to assist law
enforcement of drug and money laundering operations may be an improper use of the tax
laws. This is a topic open to wide debate, but beyond the scope of this Comment.
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B. Section 7429 Reform
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, a taxpayer had limited
procedural rights to contest a jeopardy or termination assess-
ment.20 Alternatives were slow and expensive, particularly in the
case of termination assessments.2" A taxpayer was forced to pay
the full amount of the tax and then file for a refund. If the refund
was denied, it then became necessary to bring a lawsuit. Since the
question of jeopardy was not resolved promptly, the taxpayer often
suffered "disastrous effect"27 in his business and other economic
life because his assets were tied up for long periods of time.
Section 74292" was enacted to provide taxpayers, against
25. Janes, Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments, 58 TAXES 762-69 (1980).
26. Id. at 762.
27. Goldner, Taxpayers Under Jeopardy Assessment Have Expanded Rights and
Remedies, 50 J. TAX'N 174-77 (1979).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 7429. Review of Jeopardy Assessment Procedures:
(a) Administrative review.
(1) Information to taxpayer. Within 5 days after the day on which an assessment is
made under § 6851(a), 6861(a), or 6862, the Secretary shall provide the taxpayer with a
written statement -of the information upon which the Secretary relies in making such
assessment.
(2) Request for review. Within 30 days on which the taxpayer is furnished the written
statement described in paragraph (1), or within 30 days after the last day of the period
within which such statement is required to be furnished, the taxpayer may request the Sec-
retary to review the action taken.
(3) Redetermination by Secretary. After a request for review is made under paragraph
(2), the Secretary shall determine whether or not
(A) the making of the assessment under § § 6851, 6861, or 6862, as the case may be, is
reasonable under the circumstances and
(B) the amount so assessed or demanded as a result of the action taken under § 6851,
6861, or 6862 is appropriate under the circumstances.
(b) Judicial review.
(1) Actions permitted. Within 30 days after the earlier of: (A) the day the Secretary
notifies the taxpayer of his determination described in subsection (a)(3), or
(B) the 16th day after the request described in subsection (a)(2), was made the tax-
payer may bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United
States for a determination under this subsection.
(2) Determination by district court Within 20 days after an action is commenced under
paragraph (1), the district court shall determine whether or not:
(A) the making of the assessment under § § 6851, 6861, or 6862, as the case may be, is
reasonable under the circumstances, and
(B) the amount so assessed or demanded as a result of the action taken under § § 6851,
6861, or 6862, is appropriate under the circumstances.
If the court determines that proper service was not made on the United States within 5 days
after the date of the commencement of the action, the running of the 20-day period set forth
in the preceding sentence shall not begin before the day on which proper service was made
on the United States.
(3) Order of district court. If the court determines that the making of such assessment
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whom the IRS has made a jeopardy or termination assessment of
taxes, a procedure whereby they can obtain an "expedited" judicial
and administrative review of that assessment.29 The statute pro-
vides that within five days after an assessment has been made, the
IRS is required to give the taxpayer a written statement of the
information upon which it has relied in making the assessment."
Within thirty days of receipt of the statement, the taxpayer
may request the IRS to review the assessment to determine if it is
reasonable or appropriate under the circumstances.3 1 If the tax-
payer is not satisfied with the results of the administrative review,
he may request judicial review and bring a civil action against the
United States in a federal district court. The taxpayer must file
within thirty days after the earlier of either the day the IRS noti-
fied him of its determination or the sixteenth day after he re-
quested an administrative review. 2 Within twenty days, the dis-
trict court is supposed to make an independent determination as
to whether or not it was reasonable for the IRS to make the assess-
ment and whether the amount is appropriate under the
is unreasonable or that the amount assessed or demanded is inappropriate, the court may
order the Secretary to abate such assessment, to redetermine (in whole or in part) the
amount assessed or demanded, or to take such other action as the court finds appropriate.
(c) Extension of 20-day Period where taxpayer so requests. If the taxpayer requests an
extension of the 20-day period set forth in subsection (b)(2) and establishes reasonable
grounds why such extension should be granted, the district court may grant an extension of
not more than 40 additional days.
(d) Computation of days. For purposes of this section, Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the District of Columbia shall not be counted as the last day of any period.
(e) Venue. A civil action under subsection (b) shall be commenced only in the judicial
district described in § 1402(a)(1) or (2) of Title 28 of the United States Code.
(f) Finality of determination. Any determination made by a district court under this
section shall be final and conclusive and shall not be reviewed by any other court.
(g) Burden of proof.
(1) Reasonableness of termination or jeopardy assessment. In an action under subsec-
tion (b) involving the issue of whether the making of an assessment under § § 6851, 6861, or
6862 is reasonable under the circumstances, the burden of proof in respect to such issue
shall be upon the Secretary.
(2) Reasonableness of amount of assessment. In an action under subsection (b) involv-
ing the issue of whether an amount assessed or demanded as a result of action taken under §
§ 6851, 6861, or 6862 is appropriate under the circumstances, the Secretary shall provide a
written statement which contains any information with respect to which his determination
of the amount assessed was based, but the burden of proof in respect of such issue shall be
upon the taxpayer.
29. Section 7429 was introduced into the I.R.C. of 1954 under the Tax Reform Act of
1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 § 1204(a)(1976).
30. § 7429(a)(1).
31. § 7429(a)(2).
32. § 7429(b)(1).
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circumstances."3
Section 7429 was enacted to confer due process scrutiny on all
future jeopardy and termination assessments 34 adhering to the pol-
icy of Fuentes v. Shevins5 which requires a speedy hearing in any
case where there is a denial of property by the Government. Sec-
tion 7429 was promulgated to mitigate the "hardship" of a jeop-
ardy assessment that could result from tying up a substantial part
or all of a taxpayer's assets. Taxpayers' rights against any IRS "ar-
rogance or abuse" 6 were to be strengthened by Section 7429 provi-
sions for quick resolution as to the legitimacy of any jeopardy
assessment.
C. The Venue Bar to Aliens Under Section 7429(e): Botero
v. United States
Section 7429(e) provides that a civil action brought under Sec-
tion 1346(a) 37 where the United States is a defendant shall be com-
menced only in the judicial district described in Section 1402(a)(1)
or (2)s8 of the United States Code. Section 1402(a)(1) places venue
33. § 7429(b)(2).
34. See United States v. Hall, consolidated with Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161
(1976) and Commissioner of I.R.S.v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, which stated that due process
requires that when a person's property is taken, he must be given a prompt hearing with a
showing of probable validity for the deprivation.
35. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Note that U.S. CONST. amend. V states in part "... nor [shall
any person] be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ... "
36. In some cases, taxpayers are not able to pay accounting or legal fees for representa-
tion in pending civil or criminal tax cases. See Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614. See generally Propos-
als for Administrative Changes in Internal Revenue Service Procedures: Hearings on H.R.
10612 before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and Armen, Assessing Internal Revenue Service Jeopardy Pro-
cedures: Recent Legislative and Judicial Reforms 26 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 413 (1977).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 United States as defendant.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United
States Claims Court, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of an Internal Revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected under the Internal Revenue laws . . .but
(e) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action against the
United States provided in § § 6226, 6228(a), 7426 and 7428 (in the case of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia) or § 7429 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1402 United States as defendant.
(a) Any civil action in a district court against the United States under subsection (a) of
§ 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only:
(1) Except as provided in Paragraph (2), in the judicial district where the plaintiff
resides.
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in the district where the plaintiff resides. The IRS has construed a
literal reading of Section 1402(a)(1) to be a powerful venue bar for
aliens who seek district court redress under Section 7429.
A dramatic example is Botero v. United States0 where the
Government interpreted the term "residence" for venue purposes
as synonymous with "citizenship". Under this interpretation of
Section 1402(a)(1), an alien does not reside within any judicial dis-
trict of the United States.
In 1981, Roberto Botero was indicted in an alleged $57 million
money laundering scheme. 0 An IRS jeopardy assessment froze his
U.S. bank accounts and placed a lien on his Florida home. The
IRS claimed that Botero, a Colombian national 1 but long-time
U.S. resident, owed tax on $4.5 million in unreported income."2
Botero brought a Section 7429 action seeking review of the termi-
nation assessment against him. The district court held that it
lacked venue under Section 1402(a)(1),13 and that even though res-
ident aliens have fifth amendment rights," Botero was not truly
deprived of due process because he could litigate in either the
Court of Claims or the Tax Court.'5
In 1985, after a protracted and extremely expensive legal bat-
tle, the tax assessment against Mr. Botero was reduced to practi-
cally nothing. Judge Dawson of the U.S. Tax Court, who approved
an out-of-court settlement said, "[I]t appears the IRS made a big
mistake.' 4 The district court, relying on the Government's ques-
tionable definition of residency, deprived Botero of speedy review.
Botero's tax attorney remarked:
Section 7429 was designed to prevent exactly the factual situa-
tion of the Botero case. The Government, without any concrete
basis and without an audit, tied up all of Mr. Botero's assets for
four years. If the court had interpreted the word residence to
mean domicile, Roberto Botero would have had a quick District
Court review, his money would have been released and he would
Note: Section 1402(a)(2) applies only to corporations.
39. Botero, 560 F. Supp. 616, (S.D. Fla. 1983).
40. The Miami News, May 29, 1985 at 8A, col. 1.
41. Botero, 560 F. Supp. at 617.
42. The Miami News, supra note 40.
43. Botero. 560 F. Supp. at 617.
44. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
45. Botero, 560 F. Supp. at 618.
46. The Miami News, supra, note 40. See Roberto Botero v. Commissioner, T.C. No.
8163-82 (1985).
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not have lost his home.4
The Botero court relied on Malajalian v. United States48
where the district court dismissed a refund suit pursuant to two
jeopardy assessments because of improper venue. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the decision because of the taxpayer's status as an
alien.
The rationale in Botero and Malajalian appears contrary to
the traditional concept of venue. Venue relates, not to the power to
adjudicate, but to the place where the power is to be exercised.
Venue statutes are designed to promote the convenience of the liti-
gants.49 There is no indication that Congress intended to permit
district courts to deprive taxpayers of a prompt post-deprivation
remedy with impunity, by dismissing Section 7429 proceedings on
procedural grounds.5 0 The true purpose of Section 1402(a)(1) is to
protect a plaintiff and not force him to litigate a controversy in an
inconvenient forum.5 1
Section 7429 was promulgated to expedite judicial review for a
taxpayer. Roberto Botero and Antranik Malajalian were deemed
taxpayers; yet, as of March 1983, they were unable to maintain an
action for jeopardy assessment review in the district court, even
though the Supreme Court had stated "Congress does not in gen-
eral intend to create venue gaps which take away with one hand
what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the
other."5 2
47. Interview with Robert G. Breier, Roberto Botero's tax attorney (Jan. 10, 1986). Mr.
Botero had to change his entire life-style, including having to move out of his home.
48. 504 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1974). The court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) restricts
venue in actions against the United States to the district where the plaintiff resides, and the
venue of a nonresident alien taxpayer's action against the United States to recover amounts
seized from him, cannot properly be laid in the Federal District Court of Massachusetts if
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) is read literally, since the nonresident alien did not reside in Massa-
chusetts. Also, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2) accords a nonresident alien corporate taxpayer the
privilege of bringing suit in the district where a tax return was filed but does not extend this
benefit to individuals.
49. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42 (4th ed. 1983).
50. Zuluaga v. United States, 774 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir. 1985) (Wiggins, J.,
concurring).
51. Jones v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
52. Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kochum Industries Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 (1972).
This was a patent infringement suit against an alien. The court reasoned that "Venue provi-
sions are designed, not to keep suits out of the federal courts, but merely to allocate suits to
the most appropriate or convenient federal forum." The Malajalian court distinguished
Brunette by stating that it involved the construction of conflicting statutory provisions
rather than a single governing venue statute. Malajalian, 504 F.2d at 843.
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D. The Government Turnabout in Favor of Resident Aliens:
Williams v. United States
Norma Williams was a British citizen who lived most of the
year in Boca Raton, Florida.53 Her husband had extensive business
dealings in the United States and their two children were enrolled
in a Florida school.
5 4
A Section 6861 jeopardy assessment 5 was made against Mrs.
Williams as a transferee of her husband.50 She requested and re-
ceived an administrative review57 and the IRS upheld its assess-
ment.5 8 Williams then filed a motion in U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida to abate the assessment, but the court
held that "pursuant to Sections 7429(e)59 and 1402(a)(1), 0 Wil-
liams failed to establish venue."' 1 The venue gap and the Botero,
Malajalian rationale remained unchanged.
However, when Williams came up on appeal before the Elev-
enth Circuit in May of 198382 the court said, "We have before us a
case vastly different from the case that was . . . before the District
Court. The Government, by supplemental brief, has changed its
position . . . 'Upon more mature reflection' the Government...
now concedes that a resident alien may attack a jeopardy assess-
ment without any venue bar."' The Williams court concluded
that resident alien taxpayers could establish venue under 26 U.S.C.
Sections 7429 and 1402(a)(1),"' but witheld an application of the
holding until the district court could ascertain on remand whether
53. Williams v. United States, 704 F.2d 1222, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983).
54. Id.
55. See the text of § 6861, supra note 20.
56. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1224. At the time of the jeopardy assessment notice, which
demanded prompt payment, Williams had her house up for sale.
57. See the text of § 7429(a)(2), supra note 28.
58. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1224.
59. See the text of § 1402(a)(1), supra note 38.
60. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1224. The court conferred judgment dismissing the case for
lack of venue.
61. Id. The Williams appeal came only two months after the Botero decision.
62. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1224. This was quite a turnabout for the Government. At oral
argument before the llth Circuit and for its district court stance, the Government had in-
sisted that no alien taxpayer, resident or nonresident, could avail himself of I.R.C. § 7429.
The Government also submitted its reconsidered view in other 1983 cases. See Fernandez v.
United States, 704 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1983) and the unreported Botero v. United States,
No. 81-5818 (11th Cir. 1983) (This Mr. Botero was Hernan, an older brother of Roberto).
63. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1227.
64. Id.
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Norma Williams was a resident or nonresident alien.6
With Williams, the residency status of an alien took on added
importance; resident aliens could now envoke the aegis of Section
7429.6" The Government, reflecting on its earlier position, conceded
resident aliens venue under Section 7429 given that they were
taxed as if they were U.S. citizens. Markedly different, is the treat-
ment accorded nonresident aliens, who are taxed under the Trea-
sury regulations.6
7
65. Id.
66. See generally Langer, When Does a Nonresident Alien Become a Resident for U.S.
Tax Purposes, 44 J. TAx'N 220-24 (1976).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-1 (1986).
(a) Classes of aliens. For purposes of the income tax, alien individuals are divided gen-
erally into two classes, namely, resident aliens and nonresident aliens. Resident alien indi-
viduals are, in general, taxable the same as citizens of the United States; that is, a resident
alien is taxable on income derived from all sources, including sources without the United
States. See § 1.1-1(b). Nonresident alien individuals are taxable only on certain income from
sources within the United States and on the income described in § 864(c)(4) from sources
without the United States which is effectively connected for the taxable year with the con-
duct of a trade or business in the United States. However, nonresident alien individuals may
elect, under § 6013(g) or (h), to be treated as U.S. residents for purposes of determining
their income tax liability under chapters 1, 5 and 24 of the Code. Accordingly, any reference
in §§ 1.1-1 through 1.1388-1 and §§ 1.1491-1 through 1.1494-1 of this part to nonresident
alien individuals does not include those with respect to whom an election under § 6013(g) or
(h) is in effect, unless otherwise specifically provided. Similarly, any reference to resident
aliens or U.S. residents includes those with respect to whom an election is in effect, unless
otherwise specifically provided.
(b) Classes of non-resident aliens(I) in general. For purposes of the income tax, non-
resident alien individuals are divided into the following three classes:
(i) Nonresident alien individuals who at no time during the taxable year are engaged in
a trade or business in the United States,
(ii) Nonresident alien individuals who at any time during the taxable year are, or are
deemed under § 1.871-9 to be, engaged in a trade or business in the United States, and
(iii) Nonresident alien individuals who are bona fide residents of Puerto Rico during the
entire taxable year.
Trees. Reg. § 1.871-2 (1987). Determining Residence of Alien Individuals.
(a) General. The term "nonresident alien individual" means an individual whose residence
is not within the United States, and who is not a citizen of the United States. The term
includes a nonresident alien fiduciary. For such purposes the term "fiduciary" shall have the
meaning assigned to it by § 7701(a)(6) and the regulations in part 301 of this chapter (regu-
lations on Procedure and Administration). For the presumption as to an alien's nonresi-
dence, see paragraph (b) of § 1.871-4.
(b) Residence defined. An alien actually present in the United States who is not a mere
transient or sojourner is a resident of the United States for purposes of the income tax.
Whether he is a transient is determined by his intentions with regard to the length and
nature of his stay. A mere floating intention, indefinite as to time, to return to another
country is not sufficient to constitute him a transient. If he lives in the United States and
has no definite intention as to his stay, he is a resident. One who comes to the United States
for a definite purpose which in its nature may be promptly accomplished is a transient; but,
if his purpose is of such a nature that an extended stay may be necessary for its accomplish-
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The Williams court did not answer whether nonresident aliens
may properly be denied venue under Section 7429(e).18 This ques-
tion was not before the court, but presaged the recognition of the
issue and stressed that the "most readily apparent problem con-
cerns the extent of the deprivation of the constitutional rights of
alien taxpayers, whose property has been seized by the Govern-
ment without the statutory benefits afforded all other taxpayers."89
The issue for nonresident aliens concerns their right to equal pro-
tection under U.S. law.
Hernan Botero, a nonresident alien whose unreported jeop-
ardy case7" came up in the same month as Williams, contended
that the words "upon more mature reflection" really meant that
the Government had been totally incorrect and that a perusal of
the legislative history shows a clear intent that every taxpayer, in-
cluding nonresident aliens, have review available under Section
7429.7' The Internal Revenue Code defines "taxpayer" as any per-
son (emphasis added) subject to any IRS tax.72 However, the Gov-
ernment remained solidly entrenched: "[Wle continue to remain
firmly of the view . . . that a nonresident alien . . . does not sat-
isfy . . . statutory [venue] provisions, and is thus prohibited from
bringing a Section 7429 action in any federal district court."' The
Government went on to cite the traditional Treasury regulations7'
as showing a sharp differentiation between alien residents and
nonresidents:
We believe it reasonable to conclude that the Congress deter-
mined that only resident aliens, who are obliged to report all of
their income . . . are appropriately entitled to immediate judi-
ment, and to that end the alien makes his home; temporarily in the United States, he be-
comes a resident, though it may be his intention at all times to return to his domicile abroad
when the purpose for which he came has been consummated or abandoned. An alien whose
stay in the United States is limited to a definite period by the immigration laws is not a
resident of the United States within the meaning of this section, in the absence of excep-
tional circumstances.
68. Williams 704 F.2d at 1226.
69. Id. at 1227.
70. Botero v. United States, No. 81-5818 (11th Cir. 1982).
71. See Supp. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7-8. Botero v. United States, No. 81-5818
(1lth Cir. 1983) (on file at the University of Miami INTER-AM. L. REV. office (IALR)).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14) (1984). The term "taxpayer" means any person subject to
any Internal Revenue tax.
73. See Supp. Brief for Appellee at 4 (on file at the IALR office). See also De Maria
Campos v. United States, No. C 84-180 A (N.D. Ga. 1984) where Mexican nonresident aliens
were barred from the use of § 7429 because of venue.
74. See supra note 67.
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cial review [of IRS actions]. . . .' [Slince it does not violate
due process to tax resident aliens differently from nonresident
aliens, it does not vitiate elementary principles of due process
for the Congress to. . . insist that nonresident aliens are limited
to judicial procedure. . . available. . . in the Tax Court. .. or
in the Court of Claims.71
The Government appeared to confuse language from Treasury
regulations with the intent of venue provisions in the federal court
system. Venue is a procedural device instituted to assist litigants
rather than to deprive them of a forum.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Garzon
A House Ways and Means Subcommittee, examining the
Treasury Department's role in fighting illegal drug and money
laundering operations, interviewed a convicted money launderer
called "Mario".7 Mario referred to a typical courier as a "smurf",78
usually a Latin male, known to arrive with cash in a car trunk,79
ready to visit banks in town in order to exchange cash for money
orders or cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000.
Miami has been labelled the drug capital of the world since
the narcotics boom of the mid-1970's5 0 The influx of hot
"narcobucks" has made Miami a wealthy and a dangerous city;
"the Casablanca on the Gulf Stream"."'
It is understandable that Miami police were suspicious when
they picked up Jorge Garzon, a Latin male with a shopping bag
full of cash in his car, and that they called in federal agents."2 The
IRS, in turn, felt duty-bound to make a jeopardy assessment since
to do so, it need only establish that the taxpayer's circumstances
75. Supp. Brief for Appellee at 7-8 (on file at the IALR office).
76. Id. at 8. The Government cites, in support of its reasoning, United States v. Mary-
land Savings Share Insurance Corp. 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596, 597 (1931); and
Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239, 1240 (7th Cir. 1977)) (noting that "perfect equality
... between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code has [not] been . . . a constitu-
tional sine qua non").
77. See Oversight Subcommittee, supro note 24.
78. Id. at 1320.
79. Id.
80. For an interesting view of Miami's drug involvement see Lernoux, Golden Gateway
for Drugs - the Miami Connection, The Nation (Feb. 18, 1984).
81. Id. at 186.
82. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 738.
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appear to be jeopardizing tax collection, not that they definitely do
so,8 3 and that the ultimate collection of the tax might be imperiled
by delay. 4 Garzon and his cache of currency evidently fit the
"Mario" profile of a money launderer. Garzon's seized money be-
came the basis for gross income the IRS assessed for income tax
purposes."8
The Garzon court strongly questioned the prevailing statutory
interpretation that would deprive Garzon of his constitutional
rights and the use of the review procedures provided by Section
7429. Judge Atkins evaluated the issue left open by the Williams
court: 88 is venue in the federal district court proper under Section
7429(e) even for a suspect and nonresident alien? Significantly, the
court found venue necessary because "[t]o hold otherwise would
constitute . . . a denial of equal protection. .., Counsel for
Garzon and the district court found support for the theory that the
venue bar was a violation of the right to equal protection in the
Supreme Court opinion in Plyler v. Doe.88 Plyler held that a Texas
statute, which denied undocumented [alien] schoolchildren the
free public education that it provided to children who were citizens
of the United States or legally admitted aliens, violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 "
Jorge Garzon was able to present documented evidence " that
the cash in his possession was derived from a nontaxable source. 9 '
That there are large amounts of cash in a taxpayer's possession is
not automatically a reason for the conclusion that there is taxable
income. There was no evidence offered to indicate that Garzon was
engaged in any criminal activity. 2 The opinion noted that: "On a
continuum with arbitrary and capricious at one end and substan-
83. Miller v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
84. Transport Mfg. & Equipment Co. of Del. v. Traineor, 382 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1967).
85. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 743.
86. Williams, 704 F.2d at 1227.
87. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 745; see supra note 35.
88. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
89. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV states in part: "... nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal
protection of the laws." See generally Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954), Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), Pacheco v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 546
F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976) (doubts in the construction of a statute are to be resolved in favor of
the alien).
90. Based on entry dates stamped in Ortiz' passport, Customs located the CMIR's (see
supra note 10) which documented the transported currency. Garzon, 605 F. Supp. at 741.
91. Id. at 746.
92. Id. at 745.
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tial evidence at the other, the termination assessment in this case
falls uncomfortably near the arbitrary and capricious end ... .",3
An interesting collateral aspect of the Garzon case is that the
IRS estimated Garzon's tax liability improperly. The IRS based its
figures on Section 61 of the Code94 when it should have referred to
Section 872.91
Garzon's guilt or innocence is not at issue here; what is at is-
sue is any taxpayer's right to a speedy judicial review when jeop-
ardy assessed by the IRS. Jorge Garzon's property was seized by
the U.S. Government because he fit the profile of a suspect money
launderer. The IRS improperly computed his tax liability, and no
criminal charges could be brought against him. Yet, under the
Botero and Manajalian" rationale, Garzon, as a nonresident alien,
was unable to avail himself of speedy judicial review because of a
venue technicality. His money could have been tied up for years
while he litigated and incurred costs and attorney's fees. Judge At-
kins found this untenable. Equal protection requires that Garzon
be given the opportunity for a prompt preliminary determination
by an unbiased tribunal as to the assessment's validity. 7
The Government's interest in collecting taxes is strong, but
not strong enough to deprive any plaintiff of prompt post-seizure
judicial review. The Garzon holding is an important addition to
the developing doctrine that federal courts be given great discre-
tion in determining venue. It defeats the purpose of the venue stat-
utes to use them, in some situations, to bar a worthy litigant from
having his day in court."5 The Government did file an appeal in
Garzon" but opted to have it dismissed'00 because it did not con-
sider the case a "proper vehicle" to further press the venue
issue.1
93. Id. The court in Loretto v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1977) strug-
gled to find parameters for "reasonable" jeopardy assessments.
94. 26 U.S.C. § 61 defines and discusses the derivation of gross income for citizens and
resident aliens.
95. 26 U.S.C. § 872 provides special rules for nonresident aliens.
96. Malajalian, 504 F.2d at 842 and Botero, 560 F. Supp. at 616.
97. Justice Brennan in his concurring Laing opinion, 423 U.S. at 161.
98. Jones v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
99. Garzon v. United States, No. 85-6028 (11th Cir. 1985).
100. Id Pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Fed. R. App. P., the parties stipulated and
agreed to a dismissal with prejudice in December 1985. Subsequently, an order of dismissal
was entered.
101. Interview with Stanley P. Kaplan, attorney for Jorge E. Garzon (Jan. 27, 1987).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Congress was aware of the necessity for an expeditious review
of jeopardy and termination assessments, and in 1976 it enacted
Section 7429 of the Internal Revenue Code to help mitigate the
drastic summary action taken in connection with these tax assess-
ments. Yet, in 1984 Jorge Garzon had no pre-seizure opportunity
to present evidence of his innocence. 10 2 Congress established the
Section 7429 de novo review mechanism for taxpayers to deal with
exactly this type of problem. Burdening Garzon with the obliga-
tions of taxation and then denying him a remedy afforded to all
other taxpayers was a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection,' and a contradiction to the legislative intent of Sec-
tion 7429 and the venue statutes. A person should not be subjected
to a taking of his assets without an opportunity to promptly prove
that he is entitled to a refund.
Where an IRS jeopardy assessment is reasonable and appro-
priate, the IRS can retain the money it is owed. Section 7429 was
promulgated to protect the taxpayer whether citizen, resident or
nonresident alien. Anyone who is taxed by the U.S. Government is
entitled to "the same right and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings."'' " In accordance with the holding in
Garzon, all taxpayers, resident and nonresident aliens included,
should be entitled to a prompt post-seizure judicial review under
Section 7429.
EILEEN BREIER
102. Id.; see also Garzon, Supp. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dis-
miss at 5-6 (on file at the IALR office).
103. Id.
104. Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1981).
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